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A Rock and a Hard Place:
The CWA’s Approach to
Media Policy, 1984-2002
Brian Dolber
Since its inception, the Communications Workers of America has
played an important role in lobbying on telecommunication policies. Its positions, however, have typically put short-term goals of
job creation ahead of a long-term vision for democratic communication. Since the AT&T divestiture brought an end to Fordism
in the telecom industry, the CWA often has been in the conflicted
position of seeking job security for members in a hostile political
environment while attempting to develop a just communication
system in the United States. Typically, the union has chosen the
former over the latter at the ultimate expense of both. This article
traces the history of the CWA’s lobbying efforts from the 1984
divestiture through the wave of media consolidation in the late
1990s. Trends of technological and structural convergence mandate that CWA revise its lobbying strategies in order to further a
vision of democratic communication that will benefit working
people.

T

estifying before Congress in 1988, Morton Bahr, President of the Communications Workers of America (CWA), stated “the debate over the
future of national telecommunications policy has largely focused on intellectual abstractions and concentrated too little on the workers, who are
the backbone of the industry.” Referring to massive unemployment and other economic hardships experienced by union members, Bahr argued that Congress had to
consider the “human problems created by the divestiture” of AT&T four years earlier (U.S. Congress 1988, 428-9). What Bahr did not adequately acknowledge is
that simply ensuring that culture industry workers, such as those in the CWA, are
economically protected is not necessarily advancement for the labor movement as a
whole. As the telecommunications sector changes structurally and technologically,
there are growing ramifications of such omissions.
With its roots as a company union of AT&T telephone workers, the CWA now
represents the employees of some of the biggest players in a converged, evolving
culture industry, including members of the Newspaper Guild (TNG) and the National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians (NABET). Since the
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breakup of AT&T in 1984, changes within the telecommunications and media industries have worked not only toward the convergence of capital, but the convergence of labor as well. Previous research has shown that this has had the effect of
bringing media workers together into the same organizations (McKercher 2002).
However, it has also fundamentally changed the nature of the products and services
CWA members create. Telephony, cable, Internet, video, and news become further
intertwined through changes in technology, ownership structures, and distribution;
meanwhile, the social and cultural implications of being a member of “the telephone union” are in a state of flux.
This begs the question: What role does the CWA play in shaping the media environment through policy advocacy? The mainstream of the labor movement, embodied by the American Federation of Labor (AFL) until 1955, and thereafter by
the AFL-CIO, often has taken a conservative approach as actors within the realm of
media and telecommunications policy in the United States. They have been hesitant
to oppose the commercial media system, or have not seen the value or necessity in
ensuring spaces for non-commercial communication for working-class people. For
example, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the AFL supported the formation of a
commercial broadcasting system and argued that unions should work with networks
to gain favorable programming (McChesney 1993).
The business unionism of that era, which sought to protect the narrow, shortterm interests of members within the corporate capitalist system, however, was met
with significant challenges. The Chicago Federation of Labor advocated the reservation of 25 percent of the nation’s radio spectrum for non-commercial use as part
of a broader broadcast reform movement (McChesney 1993; Godfried 1997). Soon
thereafter, the workers within the culture industries themselves organized CIOaffiliated unions, seeing the importance of the cultural apparatus in maintaining a
worker movement and in producing cultural products that would help sustain
counter-hegemonic activity. While little research has been done demonstrating the
extent to which the labor movement pushed for the creation of WPA-sponsored
cultural programs, it is clear that the presence of an organized labor movement encouraged the state to create non-commercial institutions that would, at once, employ workers and reproduce an organizing culture (Denning 1998). This trend continued into the early postwar period, as labor played a significant role in advocating
for policies that helped maintain democracy on the air within the commercial
broadcasting framework, and pushed for democratic uses of FM spectrum (FonesWolf 2006).
Thus, although labor in the United States has not fully utilized its potential to
democratize culture, an alternative approach does exist. In more conservative periods where labor has been under attack, such as the 1920s and, as this paper will
show, the neoliberal era of the 1980s and 1990s, unions have been more reluctant to
take the steps necessary in order to strengthen themselves by shaping the means of
cultural production. Here, unions find themselves between a rock (the need to protect the immediate interests of members) and a hard place (the need to change the
dominant, anti-worker order). Unions within the culture industry are in an even
more precarious position, because the preservation of their jobs may be viewed as
dependent on the maintenance of the commercial media system and advanced com-
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munications technologies, both of which perpetuate an anti-labor culture and work
towards the more efficient accumulation of capital at the expense of working people (Rollings 1983; Parenti 1986; Puette 1992; Martin 2004; Robins and Webster
1983; Dyer-Witheford 1999).
Given its emergence from a company union and its historical relationship to
AT&T, the CWA has been unable to negotiate the tension between these two demands in the post-Fordist era effectively. Through testimony and lobbying on Capitol Hill, policy reports, political endorsements, and communication with members,
the CWA has attempted to shape media policy such that it will prove beneficial for
its members in the short term. Frequently, this has meant acting in concert with
employing corporations in their lobbying efforts. Recent controversy over CWA’s
support for national cable franchising which may lead to redlining, and opposition
to network neutrality, make understanding this history all the more important for
those interested in building a democratic media system (Dolber 2007; Cook 2007).
However, business unionism has not been monolithic throughout the CWA. As
part of the broader American labor movement, pressures exist for the CWA to act
as an advocate for social and economic justice, consumer rights, and democratic
access to information. Since 2003, the CWA has played an active role in media
reform efforts addressing concentration within mass media industries, but has
sometimes shied away from staking out positions that might jeopardize the shortterm interests of its members in the telecommunications industry (Dolber 2007).
Further, the CWA is a complex, transnational organization with members in the
US and Canada working in many facets throughout the communications industries.
As affiliates of the CWA, NABET and TNG exercise a high degree of autonomy,
and have played important roles in the fight for media reform. For TNG, this dates
back to the organization’s founding during the 1930s, when George Seldes argued
that reporters should run newspapers themselves, and journalistic practices should
emphasize the plight of working people (McChesney 2004). More recently, current
TNG president Linda Foley has been an outspoken critic of media concentration,
and has repeatedly highlighted the negative impact this has had on the lives of reporters, as well as the quality of journalism ( Foley 2005). While more research
should be undertaken to explore how these internal dynamics have operated historically and today, this article will focus on the history of lobbying efforts undertaken
under the CWA banner, not its more independent constituencies. Given these contradictions, the CWA’s lobbying efforts have generally worked to affirm dominant
understandings of media and technology in order to secure economic protection for
members, sacrificing the development of working-class culture to intensifying capital accumulation through a converged communications industry.

Early History
Since its earliest years, the CWA embraced an affirmative approach towards the
corporate implementation of new media technologies. The union grew out of the
National Federation of Telephone Workers (NFTW), a reconfiguration of
“employee associations,” or company unions, which flourished after World War I.
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AT&T supported company unions in order to develop corporate pride through paternalism, and hinder the organization of independent, antagonistic trade unions in
the telephone industry. These associations resembled AT&T in their centralized
structure, leading towards worker atomization (Barbash 1952, 12).
Management harnessed employee energies in order to promote the corporate
enterprise as part of the widespread ‘American Plan’ during the 1920s (Brooks
1977, 25). Bell hired impressionable young workers and used propaganda in an
extensive training period in order to instill pride in working for a company dedicated to public service (Schact 1977, 24). By the end of the decade, AT&T had
implemented the use of “human engineering,” through which “human relations for
the Bell System became a process of indoctrination” (Brooks, 29). In addition, it
portrayed itself to the public as “Ma Bell…as cheering as the operator’s cheerful
“May I help you?”, having mastered the science of using images rather than words
to create a positive emotional relationship to the company among the “irrational”
public (Ewen 1996, 85-101; 192-6). As a result of these various efforts, Bell workers generally held a positive attitude toward their industry, despite very low wages,
until the Depression. They had a sense of pride in the public service aspect of their
employment, having been told that they and their employer shared “one common
goal” in providing communication services to the public (Schact 1977, 26-7).
The NFTW formed following the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, which
outlawed company unions. The controversial law’s constitutional approval by the
Supreme Court two years later led to the establishment of the NFTW, linking together of the employee associations at each of the regional Bell companies. Initially
unaffiliated with either the craft unions in the AFL, or the more radical industrial
unions in the newly formed CIO, the NFTW straddled the line between being an
independent employee association and a full-fledged labor union.
The NFTW made legislative activity in Washington—not organizing—its primary responsibility, because its members operated in a regulated industry where
government decisions were influential in determining work conditions (Barbash
1952, 201; 29). Through this strategy the NFTW sought to advance job, wage and
pension protection for members. However, union efforts were typically an appendage to AT&T’s operation (Schact 1977, 179-80). As one of NFTW’s first actions,
between 1940 and 1943, it fought Western Union’s attempted take over of AT&T’s
teletypewriter and leased-wire business, which would have eliminated 4,000 telephone jobs. In 1942, the NFTW stood alongside managers at AT&T’s Western
Electric against the War Department, opposing the government starting communications repair shops that would compete with the unionized company (Barbash
1952, 31-2). Labor and management also cooperated in opposing taxes on pension
plans that did not give employees a vested interest. AT&T argued that meeting
these standards would force them to drop pensions altogether, thus earning employees’ support and creating a consensus within the industry against such a tax.
Once NFTW locals united with the CIO’s telephone organizing committee to
form the CWA after a failed strike, the new union worked on several legislative
issues showing independence from employers. It supported amendments to the Fair
Labor Standards Act and legislation on equal pay for equal work, and opposition to
the anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. The CWA also persuaded the Senate Sub-
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committee on Labor-Management Relations to conduct hearings on collective bargaining at AT&T in 1950, and testified that AT&T’s control over the Bell companies bred poor labor relations. Although the majority report sided with the union,
the subcommittee affirmed AT&T’s monopoly status, recommending national bargaining between the CWA and AT&T on national issues (Schact 1977, 202-6).
Support for Democratic politicians became a standard device for the CWA’s
attempts to gain sway over policy. The CWA was one of the first unions to endorse
Truman in 1948, while the rest of the labor movement remained skeptical. President Joseph Beirne again called for Truman’s nomination in 1952 while simultaneously calling for the repeal of Taft-Hartley, which the National Labor Relations
Board had vigorously enforced during Truman’s presidency (Barbash 1952, 206).
Thus, the NFTW and the early CWA developed a Fordist relationship with employers, forming a consensus with business and politicians around the dominance of
private enterprise, so long as workers and union members were protected. Since the
neoliberal turn, however, the CWA has not presented a serious challenge to the
reemergence of a telecommunications duopoly that is increasingly central to processes of cultural production and distribution.

A Time of Transitions: 1984-1996
“The words to Auld Lang Syne could not have been more apropos for anyone than
it was for 600,000 former Bell System Employees this New Year. They will never
forget what it meant to be part of the Bell family,” the CWA News told members in
1984 (CWA News 1984a, 5). The AT&T divestiture that went into effect on the first
of the year seemed to spell the end of an era. Under a court order, the Bell System
had been restructured, forcing 588,000 employees to leave for seven independent
telephone companies, and splitting the industry into local and long distance segments. While the breakup of a major corporation may seemingly be a historical
anomaly within the context of the Reagan-era’s neoliberal ethos, this dramatic
change in the US telecommunications industry—“the largest corporate shake-up in
world history”—was a significant byproduct of the transition into a neoliberal political economy (Schiller 1999, 7).
The movement into this post-Fordist environment was met with accommodation, excitement and anxiety by the CWA leadership. In the 1970s and 1980s, the
union stood with AT&T in opposition to the government’s decree (Katz, et al 2003,
582). Feeling a sense of uncertainty with the break up of Ma Bell, the CWA attempted to secure employee benefit protections through Congress during the transition. The CWA News instructed members to write to their Senators, in an attempt to
amend the Universal Telephone Service Preservation Act of 1983. While the House
of Representatives passed a companion bill with protective provisions, the Senate
version ultimately contained no such amendment.
President Glen Watts tried to sustain a Fordist relationship between the CWA
and the new Baby Bell companies, linking worker pride to corporate success.
“CWA members can take pride in and credit for making the Bell system what it
became. The same dedication and skills that they bring with them to their new
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jobs,” he concluded, “will enable the new AT&T and seven telephone companies to
enter the competitive marketplace with full confidence and without fear of the future” (CWA News 1984a, 8). Still, the union projected an attitude of being flexible
and changing with the times, claiming that “labor must adapt to the future.” Watts
warned that “it is essential that unions undertake long term planning strategies,” as
“information age workers and industries could fall victim to the same maladies
which…paralyzed the American auto and steel industries” (CWA News 1984b, 10).
While this rhetoric worked to naturalize the changes that were happening within
the industry and larger economic landscape, it also indicated a sense of strategic
thinking. The balance between a national monopoly, the state, and labor had been
altered fundamentally, leaving workers in the telecommunications industry with the
short end of the stick throughout the next decade. While AT&T and the Regional
Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs), local carriers, pursued policies of downsizing
and manufacturing plants closed and began to move overseas, CWA representatives
testified repeatedly before a Democratic Congress in order to secure protections for
pensions, child care, and social security during the difficult Reagan years. The disintegration of Fordism—of which the divestiture was, of course, only one small
part-- did not only hurt the workforce in direct economic terms. It also had long
term implications for the development of communications technologies as CEOs
planned to rework capitalism around private network principles. Post-divestiture,
telecom companies could not automatically count on CWA support in their lobbying efforts as they had in the past. Changes within the industry—the demands of
international competition and the desire of the Baby Bells to lift restrictions placed
on them in the wake of the divestiture—drew mixed reactions from union lobbyists.
The union typically offered support to whichever companies and policies would
yield based on the biggest return on short term strategic gains (Katz, et al 2003,
582). While the union often urged that legislation be modified so that domestic jobs
were protected, the CWA ultimately allowed for the reconsolidation of the telecommunication industry by century’s end.

Fighting the MFJ
Throughout the 1980s, the RBOCs wanted the federal government to relax the
competitive restrictions imposed on the industry after the divestiture. These restrictions, established by the Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ) served consumer
interests by creating competition in long distance and new information services,
while enabling regulators to temper local rate increases. As Gene Kimmelman, legislative director of the Consumer Federation of America, told Congress, “The procompetitive purposes of the AT&T consent decree have reinforced the predivestiture Communications Act tradition of promoting affordable basic phone service” (U.S. Congress 1990b, 304).
However, the Bells were not satisfied simply offering “plain old telephone service.” Feeling the pressures of the industry, lobbyists urged Congress to permit
entry into long-distance and video-service markets (Schiller 1999, 107). Looking
down the road, telecommunication companies began speaking of an “information
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age,” claiming that technological changes demanded that Congress lift the MFJ
restrictions in order for RBOCs to remain competitive in a fast-changing industry.
The “balkanization” of the Bell System made “harmonized action” nearly impossible within the industry, ultimately hindering the development of broadband for a
social good (Schiller 1999, 106). The decade-long fight that ensued between
AT&T, the RBOCs, and the new long distance operators prevented the establishment of broadband as either a public utility or a highly regulated private utility. The
poor execution of the divestiture pitted the CWA between AT&T and the RBOCs
in the debate, forcing them to choose between supporting slightly different versions
of policies that would eventually lead to a commercially-driven Internet.
The CWA, however, did not pay a significant amount of attention to issues regarding new services in the immediate post-divestiture period. Instead, the CWA
approached the fight over the MFJ on the front on which its restrictions impacted
members’ most immediate interests—high-tech manufacturing. While the union
initially worked to protect workers’ interests, defending AT&T against Baby Bell
attempts to encroach on manufacturing, it eventually sided with the local providers,
deciding that it was in the best interest of members to allow for greater competition,
so long as it took place within the United States.
The CWA maintained strong opposition to lifting MFJ restrictions on manufacturing during the first five years following the divestiture. Several Congressional
bills were introduced throughout the mid- and late-1980s that would have allowed
the companies to enter the manufacturing and information services. The union repeatedly spoke out against such changes on the Hill, arguing that Congress should
mandate that Bell companies manufacture domestically if the restrictions were
lifted. “The Congress must set conditions which make it impossible for foreignsourced goods to be labeled or considered ‘domestic’,” said Barbara Easterling before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, adding that
the Congress should distinguish between manufacturing and assembly, if the MFJ
were to be lifted (U.S. Congress 1986, 168).
However, by 1990, the CWA changed its tune, forming a general consensus
with the RBOCs on scrapping the MFJ regulations. Testifying in favor of S. 1981,
the Telecommunications Equipment Research and Manufacturing Act, Easterling
told the Subcommittee on Communications that 150,000 jobs had been lost at
AT&T and the seven RBOCs since the break-up. “The divestiture was an unwise
action in that it fully opened the United States market without the necessary trade
agreements to secure the full cash register ringing access to foreign markets,” argued Easterling. In order to remedy these problems, Easterling said that it was appropriate to support the bill, because it would “allow the Bell operating companies
to manufacture equipment domestically.” The bill did not, however, explicitly prevent manufacturing abroad—it simply did not explicitly encourage it. Easterling
suggested additional measures to ban “‘Maquiladora’-style operations in Mexico,
which have proven so popular among the Fortune 500 and AT&T” (U.S. Congress
1990b, 289).
While AT&T opposed the bill, avoiding competition in manufacturing from the
RBOCs, BellSouth and its peers favored the legislation, calling it a “big step toward a policy that serves America’s economic interests domestically and interna-
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tionally.” BellSouth chairman John Clenendin argued that the MFJ was hindering
technological progress and innovation. Calling it “out of sync with the realities of
global commerce and the demands of an information economy,” Clenendin testified
alongside Easterling in favor of Baby Bell entry into new sectors in order to remain
competitive in a globalizing industry. Arguing that S. 1981 would promote the
“general welfare,” he said that the debate about the MFJ went far beyond being a
dispute between AT&T and the Bell holding companies. “If S. 1981 becomes
law,” Clenendin attested, “I am sure that contrary to what some have asserted, BellSouth will continue to be one of AT&T’s largest customers” (U.S. Congress 1990b,
14-5).

Going Global
In conjunction with the manufacturing controversy, the CWA wanted to ensure that
the telecommunications industry remained a key player in the domestic economy,
creating jobs and exporting products to the rest of the world. The breakup of AT&T
spurred a trade deficit within the U.S. telecommunications industry. According to
Bahr’s 1988 testimony, the industry ran a $900 million trade surplus in 1982, the
year that the impending divestiture was announced. By 1988, that had turned into a
$2.7 billion trade deficit (U.S. Congress 1988, 428).
The perils facing the industry wrought by deregulation drove the CWA to lobby
to protect the very industry that was badly hurting members’ livelihoods, ensuring
that the US would remain competitive in telecom manufacturing. Throughout the
period, CWA representatives went before House and Senate committees, supporting various bills that would have strengthened tariffs on imports and encouraged
low tariffs on exports. In 1984, John Morgan, Assistant to the Executive Vice President, testified before a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Finance Committee supporting a bill while arguing that many of its provisions needed to be strengthened
by investing greater power in the executive branch to impose tariffs in order “to
ensure that the United States retains a telecommunications manufacturing base; we
have seen the unfortunate examples in shoes, color TVs, steel, autos and machine
tools and do not want to see our industry similarly burdened as a result of our own
government’s action” (U.S. Congress 1984, 27). Similarly an AT&T executive vice
president supported the bill in order to promote open world trade in telecommunications equipment. However, rather than suspending all trade agreements, as the
bill recommended, he argued that it “should allow a more focused approach aimed
at negotiating new trade agreements” (U.S. Congress 1984, 33). Ironically, while
seeking legislation to protect itself and help its markets, AT&T railed against nontariff trade barriers in developed countries such as local content requirements that
impeded US business. While the CWA and AT&T had different ideas about modifying the bill, they found themselves working towards the same end: protecting
American telecom manufacturing at the expense of other nations developing their
industries.
Calling the AT&T divestiture “a unilateral giveaway of unlimited access to the
United States market, without any kind of corresponding action to open other na-
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tions’ markets,” Morgan returned to the Senate, supporting the proposed Telecommunications Trade Act of 1985. AT&T claimed the bill “would take significant
steps toward addressing the substantial trade barriers U.S. telecommunications
companies face in their foreign marketing efforts” (U.S. Congress 1985, 239). The
rest of the emerging U.S. telecom industry disagreed with the bill’s methods.
Edwin Spievack, President to the North American Telecommunications Association, argued, “protectionism would be catastrophic. Prices would rise for U.S. consumers…And AT&T’s manufacturing monopoly would be reinstated.” The other
option, Spievack argued, was expanding export opportunities, which he said were
not adequately addressed in the legislation, as it did not guarantee that Americanmade products would be sold overseas (178).
The CWA also came to support lowering trade barriers in other nations in order
to expand US exports, thereby protecting jobs by strengthening American hegemony within the industry. Testifying before Congress in 1987, Bahr offered union
support to H.R. 3, which encouraged the United States to open international trade
barriers to American telecom products. Bahr argued that the bill would “force our
trading partners to play by fair rules and develop reciprocal trade practices.” Arguing that American telecommunication workers had the ability to be productive due
to their individual abilities, high levels of skills, and education, Bahr claimed that
CWA members could compete with any workers in the world, if the policies were
in place to encourage U.S. exports. He noted that the AT&T divestiture and deregulation “were taken without a single thought to our international trade position. Before 1984, telecommunications was a uniquely American industry. Today, barely
three years later, not a single residential telephone is made in America” (U.S. Congress 1987b, 72). Later, CWA vice president James Irvine went on record to
“support fair trade” and “oppose protectionism,” demanding that incentives be
given to keep U.S. companies based within US borders. “We fear that the laissezfaire trade policies of the 1980s will contribute to an even greater economic catastrophe [than the Great Depression] from which we may never recover. And telecommunications, America’s so-called hi-tech industry of the future, will go the
same way as our basic, manufacturing industry (176-7).
Despite criticism of AT&T and the neoliberal approach, the industry also
backed the legislation, as all were in general agreement about the need to encourage
exports. “Liberalized interconnection rules, the AT&T divestiture and the creation
of an atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty within the industry have created a
window of opportunity which our overseas competitors have successfully exploited,” stated Edward D. McKeever, vice president of AT&T International (U.S.
Congress 1987a, 118). Spievack also supported the bill, calling it “seven years too
late,” and arguing that it still needed to address deeper issues through anti-dumping
laws, lifting restrictions on high-technology exports, and other legislative efforts to
encourage private development (139-58).

From Old to New Media
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Beginning in the 1980s, the popular press, business literature, and journalism all
promoted the idea of an “information revolution” that would enable capital accumulation and privatization efforts (Dyer-Witheford 1999, 21-2). For labor, though,
these changes were widely viewed as an opportunity to create jobs in an expanding
sector as industrial work was rapidly being exported to other corners of the world.
Organized labor has typically affirmed dominant notions about expansion in information technology, despite the fact that, for corporations, “information technology
represents just another series of exchange-values which by no means correspond to
real social needs” (Robins and Webster 1984, 202).
By the 1990s, the CWA embraced the myth of the “information revolution,” in
the lead up to the Telecommunications Act of 1996. While the MFJ prevented
RBOCs from going into “information services,” the CWA saw the possibility for
domestic job creation if this particular restriction was lifted. Unlike manufacturing,
providing information services—going beyond POTS—could not be accomplished
outside of U.S. borders. At the same time the CWA had come out in favor of relaxing manufacturing barriers, they came to support RBOC entry into new service
markets. In 1990, Bahr told Congress to let “the BOCs enter the information services business, since these companies have facilities and technical knowhow and
the incentive to foster the ‘Information Age.’” Despite opposition from media
companies, the CWA contended that BOCs and other local exchange telephone
companies should be allowed to provide cable TV services (U.S. Congress 1990a,
167).
In 1993, Easterling told the Senate that restrictions on telephone companies
from entering the cable market were “anticompetitive” and encouraged the telephone companies to “invest billions of dollars in foreign enterprise” (U.S. Congress 1993, 224). While the CWA viewed this technological and economic
change as aiding in the creation of union jobs, they located their position within the
dominant rhetoric, highlighting the benefits of the information economy. Bahr testified in 1994 before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, calling market
restrictions “out of date” due to convergence and new technologies. Affirming neoliberal notions of the benefits of a converged media system to the national and
global economy, Bahr said that the union views
the national information infrastructure proposals very positively
in many respects. The NII will lead to the wider dissemination of
knowledge and information and, we earnestly hope, to the creation of high-value, high-wage jobs. “Information superhighways”
will play a pivotal role in providing a competitive advantage to
our economy in the global marketplace. Our nation will benefit
greatly by crafting a new policy framework to encourage the development of our information superhighways as efficiently as
possible (U.S. Congress 1994a, 697).
In 1995, Easterling testified again, calling for “open entry to markets. Since the old
‘boundaries’ of local exchange, long distance and cable TV have become so indistinct as to have taken on an arbitrary quality, we believe the old restrictions should
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be lifted” (U.S. Congress 1995, 335). However, Easterling did note that the CWA
opposed “increasing the limits and thus adding to concentration of broadcast station
ownership” (336).
This approach to approving of an intensification of corporate control over communication systems on the one hand, while advocating for diverse ownership on the
other makes logical sense if we see the CWA’s primary objective as job creation
for members. As capital was looking to converge, albeit with labor’s consent, unions were beginning to respond, in order to protect jobs, wages and benefits within
the culture industry. The consolidation of broadcast networks would not only be
detrimental to the public, but would also make members of the recently-affiliated
NABET vulnerable. Like the CWA itself, NABET has a long history of compromise and has suffered from lack of unity, a weak economic position, and narrow
goals (Wasko 1983, 105).
The affiliation of TNG did not guarantee that the CWA would develop a substantially broader view of media policy. Unable to stand on its own in opposition to
the fast-changing newspaper industry, TNG had long sought a merger with a larger
union, and wanted to ensure a separate culture from the rest of the CWA. Like
other unions, they had suffered during the Reagan-era, and had been forced to protect basic economic interests, unable to take a more proactive, social unionist approach (McKercher 2002).
Testifying on telecommunications legislation, consumer activist Ralph Nader in
1994 told Congress that “information is more than a commodity, it is the way we
learn, persuade and communicate, we believe that competition in content markets
should be a paramount goal in a democratic society” (U.S. Congress 1994b, 370-1).
While the CWA’s expansion deeper into the culture industry sector has made it
increasingly interested in issues of media diversity, and vocal on reform, it has not
adopted such an overarching theory of media’s role in society or the impact of commercial media on workers that dictates media and telecommunication policy positions. This became most apparent in the union’s position on the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and has persisted since.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996
In March 1996, the CWA News boasted, “With President Morton Bahr and Secretary-Treasurer Barbara Easterling nearby, President Clinton on February 8 changed
the course of telecommunications history with the stroke of a pen when he signed
into law the Telecommunications Act of 1996.” Easterling claimed that the bill
“marks a new era.” Within that single month, the News reported that “a torrent of
activity” had taken place: Baby Bell U.S. West announced plans to purchase Continental Cablevision, while AT&T and MCI began talking about competing against
RBOCs as local carriers. The News also reported criticisms of the bill coming from
the Consumers Federation of America and the ACLU, two historical allies of the
labor movement in media reform struggles (CWA News 1996a, 3).
The CWA took a “cautious approach” to the legislation. On the one hand, supporters of the bill promised to meet the union’s immediate economic needs by cre-
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ating 21st century jobs. Democratic congressman Rick Boucher called it the “largest
jobs creation measure of the first four years of the Clinton administration,” expecting to generate 3.5 million new jobs in telecom and $400 billion investment in cable and infrastructure for TV. In a 1997 resolution, the union stated that they supported the law, expecting it to “expand access to advanced telecommunications
services through lower prices, stimulate investment in new facilities and equipment,
improve service quality, speed deployment of new telecommunications technologies, and promote the growth of good jobs in the industry” (CWA Executive Board
1997). However, much was left unknown. The News argued that while the act was
“hailed… as a as a harbinger of jobs…[a] number of issues for workers and consumers remain unresolved as local, long distance, and cellular telephone companies
and broadcast, cable TV and Internet providers prepare to compete head on” (CWA
News 1996a, 10).
Leading up to the act’s passage, media reform advocates expected that the Democratic Clinton-Gore administration would work to develop an Internet that encouraged media diversity and access to information, washing away many of the
problems associated with corporate-controlled “old media.” Surrounded by excitement about a world interconnected by an information superhighway, however, the
act changed the logic of regulation within the communication industries, with virtually no dissent coming from either political party. The law now claimed that greater
control over the majority of the nation’s media by a few companies was in the public interest (Chester 2007, 17, 41).
To a great extent, the CWA perpetuated the dominant mythology with the expectation that the bill would create jobs. Despite their mixed reaction to the final
bill, the union heralded the liberatory power of communications technology, arguing that regulations were stifling innovation and damaging the national economy.
As they reported in the CWA News, the expected growth in the communications,
information, and entertainment sectors
has big, strong, profitable corporations prepared to crawl around
on their hands and knees to get a piece of the action. For CWA
members and potential members, the revolution means jobs. For
America’s children and future generations, the revolution could
spell the difference between prosperity and poverty… (CWA
News 1995a, 6).
The union offered members an optimistic look at changes in the media and communications industries, and presented itself as the labor organization of the future. On
the eve of the TNG-CWA merger, for example, a News article in 1995 reported
the future of work may be brighter than ever, although there will
be massive changes and greater challenges than ever to organize
the unorganized. As the world becomes more and more wired (or,
in the case of the telephone, perhaps less wired) the need for information gatherers, editors, and writers and other to deliver the
product will greatly expand. “Newspapers will exist,” [TNG
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President Linda] Foley says, “both as a product you can hold and
also on the Internet, the information highway.” … We are rapidly
moving into a single information industry, speeded along by the
convergence of telecommunications, the print and broadcast media, cable TV and entertainment (CWA News 1995b, 6).
In addition, the CWA News touted the Internet as a new organizing tool in NABET’s contract fight with NBC. Showcasing the power of the web, NABET-CWA
Local 41 President Ray Taylor told the News, “NBC’s been unable to capitalize on
their network ratings success, because their local news has not been able to catch
up.” From their perspective, the brave new world the union was entering provided
great opportunities for all (CWA News 1995c, 7).
The only casualty in the information age, repeatedly referred to by the CWA,
would be those who remained unconnected. Warning of the possibility of a division
of society into “information haves and have-nots,” Bahr told the Social Democrats
USA in 1995 that “[w]ithout pressure from labor, consumer groups and government, the information superhighway will be driven solely by the profit motive—
and such competitive markets are unfair in distributing information” (CWA News
1995b, 6). Thus, build-out and universal service requirements—both of which
would expand job opportunities—became key legislative concerns for the union
(U.S. Congress 1995).
The union was not completely blind to the undemocratic ways in which capital
sought to implement new technologies. Discussing the development of CWA convergence councils to examine the commonalities among media and telecommunications workers in the burgeoning environment, Bahr, who sat on Vice President
Gore’s influential Council on the National Information Infrastructure, noted,
Vice President Al Gore has stated his dream this way—that one
day a child in Carthage, Tenn. will be able to access information
in the Library of Congress from his or her home computer. This
is in contrast to the shallow dream of the phone company executive who sees a mini-movie theater in every living room in America (Keefe and Batt 1997, 58; CWA News 1996b, 2).
Thus, Gore connected information and modernization, and promoted the myth that
the Internet would bring “robust and sustainable economic progress, strong democracies, better solutions to global and local environmental challenges, improved
health care, and—ultimately—a greater sense of shared stewardship of our small
planet” (Mosco 2004, 38-39). Rather than challenge this propagandistic discourse,
the CWA formed a consensus with the state and capital on the benefits of network
development.
Without presenting a formidable challenge to the Telecom Act, the CWA consented to the Internet’s for-profit development. The act brought an end to the regulations imposed by the 1984 divestiture. In addition, Section 202(h), proposed by
Rupert Murdoch, specified that the FCC had to review media ownership restrictions
every two years, and determine “whether any of the ownership rules …are neces-
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sary in the public interest” as a result of the new “competition” (Chester 2007, 4243). Despite CWA’s attempts to address the needs of workers in a converged media
industry, their main focus had seemingly not shifted from securing short-term gains
for workers in the telecommunications sector. While even in a best-case scenario,
the bill would have created jobs for telecom workers, it placed the positions of
other union members in jeopardy, particularly those belonging to TNG and NABET, running counter to the CWA’s “major strategic goal”: “Wall-to-Wall organization within the information industry” (Keefe and Batt 1997, 58).

Mergers, Acquisitions and the New Media Environment (19962002)
The Telecommunications Act not only damaged the livelihood of culture industry
workers, but also presented a challenge to the development of democratic media. In
the following years, the U.S. telecom and media landscapes changed dramatically.
Squabbles developed between long distance carriers and local telephone companies, and cable and satellite broadcasters, before the FCC and the Justice Department in efforts to obtain the most favorable regulations (McChesney 2000, 66). In
addition, the lifting of MFJ restrictions did not spur local-exchange carrier entry
into the information service and video provision markets. Instead, local carriers
could not meet the expense of residential network modernization and put inclusive
broadband access on hold. Long distance companies faced the choice of either buying local network capacity or creating their own parallel local networks at a high
cost (Schiller 1999, 107). Thus, the CWA reported in 2001 that the law had allowed
most residential and small business consumers to benefit from stable local rates and
declining long distance rates, while monopoly cable rates climbed more than 30
percent. “Downward competitive pressures” had hurt telephone workers, “the rollout of cable telephony has been plagued with problems,” and broadband deployment remained slow and sporadic (Goldman 2001).
Telecom was not the only area affected by the act. The new law led to further
convergence between telecom and old media sectors. Almost all the major media
firms, including Time Warner, Disney and News Corporation quickly allied with
telecom and software firms, culminating in the $160 billion AOL-Time Warner
merger in January 2000. The short-lived AT&T-TCI merger of this period gave the
phone company “interests in a large stable of media assets,” but eventually TCI
became part of the anti-union Comcast.
In addition to new media, the 1996 Act also changed old media structures. Radio came to look drastically different. With relaxed ownership restrictions, allowing
one firm to own up to eight stations in a single market, a few massive chains came
to quickly dominate the entire industry. FCC extensions of relaxed ownership restrictions, in accord with the act, paved the way for consolidation in television
(McChesney 2000, 75-6). In essence, the Telecomunications Act solidified the neoliberal project’s presence in media policy making by establishing “that the private
sector would determine the future of US electronic media and digital communication” (128).
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The CWA had inadvertently consented to the systematic exclusion of labor and
other components of civil society from media policy making. In the tumultuous
years following the act, CWA frequently spoke out against changes in the telecommunication industry, pressuring the FCC to block several major mergers. In February 1998 the CWA filed charges with the FCC in an attempt to block the merger
between MCI and WorldCom, calling it “anti-competitive as defined by the Telecommunications Act and the FCC’s public interest guidelines” (CWA News
1998c). President Bahr noted that this merger would allow the company to control
“more than 60 percent of the Internet backbone the key to the communications infrastructure” (CWA News 1998b). The CWA News also reported the European
Commission’s decision to require MCI to sell its Internet assets as a condition of its
merger, in conjunction with the union’s efforts to block the merger on the other
side of the Atlantic (CWA News 1998a).
However, the CWA did not take the position that mergers in the telecom industry were categorically harmful. Instead, the union portrayed itself as agreeable to
consolidation so long as the corporations were not explicitly anti-union, allowing
organization within the workplace. Viewing political action as one part of making
shop floor gains, alongside bargaining and organizing, the CWA decided it was in
members’ best interests to support mergers among the RBOCs, helping them compete against large global corporations, such as AT&T, Sprint, WorldCom-MCI, and
various foreign-based international carriers (Katz, et al 2003, 582). In the wake of
the announced AT&T-SBC merger, Bahr outlined his goal in the CWA News: wallto-wall organization. “Memo to industry: Make no mistake—that is our goal for the
entire industry, sooner rather than later” (CWA News 1997, 2). In addition, the
CWA spoke out against AT&T’s plans to split into four companies, under the logic
that it would disrupt the possibility of bundled services, as the News mourned the
potential loss of a consumer’s utopia in 2001.
Imagine being able to deal with your long distance phone company, your cable service, your wireless provider—maybe your
local phone company, too—in a single telephone call. One stop
shopping, with a minimum of canned music. That’s the direction
AT&T had been heading over the past two years, spending $110
billion to buy cable, wireless, and local phone company access to
become a multi-service provider (CWA News 2001, 5).
Later, in 2002, the CWA announced its support of cable provider Comcast’s decision to purchase AT&T Broadband, claiming that “workers would gain greater opportunity under the merged company, including a more positive labor relations approach.” (Northwest Labor Press 2002). For the CWA international leadership, “big
media” were fine so long as they were also unionized.

Conclusion
The CWA has often found itself working in cooperation with employers, particu-
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larly the telecommunication companies. Although the CWA joined the CIO in the
1940s, its pre-history as an amalgamation of company unions provided it with a
very different history than other industrial unions of the era. The advantages of
working in a highly regulated industry during the postwar era did not adequately
prepare the union to deal with the shock it would be delivered in the neoliberal age.
Rather than rethinking the Fordist labor-capital alliance in light of the AT&T divestiture, the CWA continued to promote communications policies that would benefit
employers in order to advance short-term organizing goals.
While the first five years following the divestiture saw the CWA maintain its
allegiance to Ma Bell, the union repositioned its policy goals in alignment with the
RBOCs by 1990, supporting the MFJ repeal in order to expand jobs in the manufacturing sector. There is little evidence that concerns regarding the implications of
“competition” in broadband, video and other services were taken into consideration. This approach culminated in the union’s general support for the Telecommunications Act of 1996, when the CWA replicated the utopian rhetoric around convergence, the Internet, and the “information age.”
The importance of pursuing short-term organizing goals should not be diminished. Since the 1980s, unions have had to fight against the rollback of New Dealera protections and the implementation of neoliberal trade deals. While politicians,
executives, and union leaders have hailed telecommunications as the industry of the
future, CWA members have endured lost jobs and broken promises. The immediate
needs which the CWA and other unions fight for, such as health care, pensions and
job security, must not be overlooked.
However, the contradiction between short-term interests and a broader longterm vision for communication and culture is illusory. An examination of the social
unionism of the CWA’s early CIO sister unions might be instructive in reshaping
its lobbying efforts in order to challenge the neoliberal order in an era of convergence, consolidation and new media. Such an approach is already being taken by
CWA affiliates such as TNG, to the extent that they may within the CWA’s framework. The CWA as a whole has yet to embrace this view fully in developing its
lobbying strategy. While its historical trajectory has often placed the CWA alongside its employers in legislative efforts, alternative paths do exist from within the
union’s own tradition. These might be followed to develop new strategies, and ultimately, a more democratic media system.
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